Demand for Statehood: The Case of Native Military Recruitment in World War II

Abstract

This paper examines how the demand for independence appeared in the era of Decolonization. I argue that nationalist movements were more likely to emerge in places where the colonial authorities recruited the native population in World War II. The theory highlights the role of war veterans in creating the demand for independence and in facilitating it through organized collective action. Drawing on original World War II native recruitment data, an analysis of nationalist movements in sub-national units from 1939 to 1984 provides evidence consistent with the theory. The findings in this study help us better understand the rise of nationalist movements in the 20th century and the political effects of military service.

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Introduction

Where and when do nationalist movements emerge? This question is central to political science, but our understanding of it remains incomplete. In particular, how the demand for decolonization appeared remains overlooked from the literature on secession and state formation (Spruyt 2005; Roeder 2007; Coggins 2011, 2014; Griffiths 2015, 2016; Fazal and Griffiths 2014). On the other hand, the literature acknowledges that colonial legacy had a profound impact on the political development of new independent states, but its effect on the emergence of nationalism is surprisingly understudied (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001; Wucherpfennig, Hunziker and Cederman 2016; Eck 2018). In this paper, I address these issues by focusing on one global event: native recruitment in World War II (WWII).

I argue that native military recruitment worked in favor of post-war nationalist movements. By generating a unique group of the population — veterans — native recruitment in WWII helped nationalist movements flourish in post-war colonial societies for two reasons. First, military experiences familiarize veterans with organized group actions and the use of violence. These traits lowered the barriers to risky political movements in the postwar period, other things being equal. Second, military experiences raise the demand for independence because veterans become dissatisfied with their postwar economic and political status. Military service leads to the desire for socioeconomic compensation after the end of war, which often exceeds what the governments are willing to offer. Furthermore, war veterans see the existing social order as obsolete, given the better treatment they received during the war. Taking these two mechanisms together — organizational advantages and aspiration for independence — military experiences in WWII led veterans to participate in nationalist protests and resistance. Therefore, where states recruited from the native population in WWII, organizing nationalist movements was easier and faster.

Drawing on original WWII native recruitment data, I test the hypothesis that military recruitment facilitated the emergence of nationalist movements in the postwar era. A random effects analysis controlling for observable confounders provides supportive evidence for the

hypothesis. I find that native recruitment makes "segment-states" about three times more likely to develop nationalist movements.[1] The effect of native recruitment persists during the first ten years after the war and then it decays, which supports the previous findings on the effect of military service (Jackson et al. 2012; Jha and Wilkinson 2012; Erikson and Stoker 2011). I also show that the finding is robust to alternative estimation strategies, including metropole, regional, and year fixed effects. Further addressing endogeneity between recruitment and nationalist movements, I provide evidence that high levels of nationalism before WWII reduced the likelihood of recruiting from the native population. This suggests that the main finding is not an artifact of recruitment being easier in the segments where the potential for nationalist movements was already high.

This study makes three major scholarly contributions. First, using newly collected data, I design and test the first quantitative analysis of the impact of WWII native recruitment globally, including in areas that did ultimately become states. Although previous studies have shown that war veterans play a role in generating political and social changes (Woloch 1979; Krebs 2006; Edele 2008), we do not fully understand the degree to which this occurs. The study also broadens the scope of prior research by examining colonial ex-servicemen, whereas most studies focused on the veterans in the existing nation-states.[2] Second, this paper contributes to the bottom-up theory of state formation in the 20th century, drawing on the burgeoning literature on how the prior-experiences of individuals guide their future political actions (Horowitz and Stam 2014). Distinct from the previous accounts that mostly focus on the incentives of colonial powers to grant independence (Roeder 2007; Coggins 2014; Griffiths 2016; Spruyt 2005; Alesina and Spolaore 1997), the paper looks at the motives and restraints of the colonial population in developing the demand for a nation-state. Third, the

[1]To analyze sub-national units like colonies, I use 'segment-states' as the unit of analysis first provided by Roeder (2007). Segment-states consist of colonies, dependencies, protectorates, mandates, autonomous regions, and the former Soviet Republics.

[2]Historians examined WWII native military recruitment, mostly based on the African experiences (Olusanya 1968; Israel 1992). While many historians acknowledged that war veterans were instrumental players in nationalist politics (Shiroya 1968, pp. 92-93), some argued that retired veterans were not so much interested in the politics of nationalism and rather cared mostly about their private interest (Schleh 1968; Killingray 1983).

study provides an alternative mechanism of how "war made states" (Tilly 1992, p.67) by highlighting the effect of war on individual veterans and their roles in creating new nation-states.

The paper proceeds by presenting the theory of how native recruitment results in the creation of nationalist movements. Next, I discuss the empirical strategy and data for testing the argument. The subsequent section provides results from a random effects regression analysis and alternative model specifications. Then, I address a possible objection about the potential endogeneity between native recruitment and the likelihood of post-war nationalism. Lastly, the paper concludes.

Theory: Organizational Capacity and Demand for Independence

Nationalism and nationalist movements were regarded as the key components of nation-state formation, especially for the late-comers outside Europe.[3] In this paper, I define nationalist movements as collective resistance against the government, which claims a subset of territory and population with its intention to form a new independent nation-state.[4] Under this definition, the task for explaining nationalist movements is also two-fold: where does the resistance against the existing authority come from, and how can individual actions become collective?

Accordingly, I suggest two causal pathways connecting native military recruitment in WWII and collective resistance. The first is through reducing the cost of collective action. I argue that war veterans' military and combat experiences help reduce the cost of engaging in future collective actions. Second, veterans form an anti-government sentiment since wartime experiences lead them to be dissatisfied with their postwar economic and political status. Taken together, these two mechanisms explain why and how nationalist resistance could

[3]Ernest Gellner succinctly stated the importance of nationalism in state formation: "it is nationalism which engenders nations, and not the other way around" (Gellner 1983, p.55).

[4]The definition focuses on the context of the 20th century, when the existing nation-states had already controlled the territory that nationalist movements covet. This context equates nationalist movements to secessionist movements or anti-colonial movements, which accompany the internal resistance against existing nation-states (Coggins 2011).

be easily and effectively organized in the places where the native population was recruited during WWII.

Military Backgrounds and the Cost of Collective Action

I argue that the native ex-servicemen are likely to participate in nationalist movements because their military backgrounds reduce the cost of collective action. Military disciplines commonly require "the total individual's conformity to a prescribed role, including one's behavior, attitudes, beliefs, values, and definitions"(Arkin and Dobrofsky 1978, p.158). By receiving military training and engaging in combat activities, soldiers gain the experiences of organizational hierarchy and individual duties, which help organize and mobilize group actions (Finkel 2015; Horowitz and Stam 2014). The experiences do not simply fade away: scholars suggest that the military experiences continued to influence behaviors even after retirement because soldiers learn the norms associated with their work roles (Jenning and Markus 1977; Jackson et al. 2012; Roberts, Caspi and Moffitt 2003). Jha and Wilkinson (2012), for instance, find that the Indian veterans with combat experiences in WWII had successfully overcome collective action problems in using coercion as a group (Jha and Wilkinson 2012).

Formal organizations for veterans illustrate how they are equipped with advantages for facilitating political and social movements. As early as the French Revolution, retired veterans created fraternal organizations based on social networks they acquired during military service (Woloch 1979; Edele 2008). The organizations aim to advance the veterans' needs in their civilian lives, often generating various types of political activism, including protest and petition (Ortiz 2004). These organizations played a pivotal role in uniting the retired soldiers, which gave them a strong collective political voice in the post-war period (Ortiz 2004, p.1).

Nationalist protests in Ghana exemplify the advantages of veterans in organizing collective action. Cameron Abongo Duncan, the regional chairman of the ex-servicemen union for

the Western Region of Ghana, explained in one interview how he helped mobilize the soldiers for the historic Accra riots in 1948 (Howard 1999, p.15). In the protest organized by Kwame Nkrumah, who would become the first President of independent Ghana, the regional leaders of the ex-servicemen union called up the former soldiers from each of their districts. The leaders instructed veterans to gather in Accra on the 28th of February; some two thousand former-servicemen marched to Christiansborg Castle, the residence of the British governor of the Gold Coast in West Africa (Crawford 2015). Hence, the ex-servicemen union played a critical role in gathering numbers for demonstration by using their organizational advantages. Furthermore, it also worked as a representative organ that directly negotiated with the colonial office. Representing the protesters, the leadership of the union negotiated with the colonial government and won permission to march through the streets (Crawford 2015).

Also, military backgrounds reduce the cost of using violence. The tendency for re-using violence after demobilization has been widely reported in civil war literature (Grossman, Manekin and Miodownik 2015; Kaplan and Nussio 2018). Veterans, especially those with combat experience, are more comfortable using violence (Arkin and Dobrofsky 1978; Jha and Wilkinson 2012). Some of the Kenyan veterans in WWII wanted to "transfer their martial status back to civilian life," and requested permission from the colonial government to carry spears (Brands 2005, p.115). Participating in nationalist movements, especially in the post-WWII periods, run the risk of engaging in violent clashes or conflicts against the colonial authorities. Veterans are less likely to be restrained by such a risk than non-veterans because their prior training and experiences familiarize the nature of conflicts and the use of violence (Grossman, Manekin and Miodownik 2015). The earlier example of the Accra riots also demonstrates how veterans would respond to the risk of violence. When the British Police fired against the protesters, rather than fleeing from the site, the protesters "rushed the police officers and beat them" (Howard 1999, p.16).

Veterans and the Demand for Independence

I also argue that wartime experiences of veterans increase the demand for independence. In general, veterans are likely to form anti-government attitudes after they return to civilian life (Jenning and Markus 1977; Jackson et al. 2012). One reason is based on the economic motives after the service. Veterans, whether they joined the military voluntarily or forcedly, seek economic compensation in return for their wartime service (Brands 2005, p.115). However, their expectation often exceeds what most post-war governments can offer. This was especially the case for the colonial servicemen who should have been far from a priority for the governments (Parsons 1999, pp. 232-247). With the belief that they deserve better economic compensation in return for the service, veterans demanded pensions, employment, and social readjustment in the post-war period (Killingray 1983; Leal 2003). In other words, wartime service causes anti-government sentiment among veterans who want "the just reward for their people's sacrifice" (Krebs 2006, p.3).

Furthermore, veterans are likely to share motives to correct the existing political and social orders because they experience the alternatives to them (Woloch 1979; Leal 2003; Edele 2008; Parker 2009). Military service accompanies greater mobility, especially in wartime, exposing soldiers to new political and social relations. The exposure to new norms and idea enables soldiers to rethink the old rules of discrimination, resent them, and act in favor of the alternative political orders they had experienced (Parker 2009).

Historians note the immense psychological impact of wartime experiences on the racial attitude of the colonial servicemen. During the war, African soldiers fought with and against the Europeans, which helped overcome the idea of racial hierarchy (Headrick 1978, pp. 511-513). African soldiers dispatched in the Middle East commonly expressed their satisfaction at working and living with the British soldiers "who fraternized with them as equals" (Parsons 1999, p.232). Similarly, scholars report that the minority soldiers in the United States had a stronger sense of entitlement because they feel obliged to represent and fight for their discriminated community (Leal 2003; Parker 2009). For instance, Parker describes

that the African American soldiers dispatched overseas were "treated with more respect and dignity in these societies than they had been accustomed to in the South" (Parker 2009, p.117). Returning to their home country, the black American veterans resented the pervasive discrimination remaining in society and led their community fighting for equal treatment. Leal also reports that the returning Latino soldiers were more supportive and active than the Latino non-veterans in removing "the usual barriers to full political and economic participation" (Leal 2003, p.205-206).

Overall, the theory stands on the basis of the existing findings on how military experiences shape individual preferences. Military experiences affect a person's self-concept and values (Jackson et al. 2012) and political attitudes (Jenning and Markus 1977; Erikson and Stoker 2011) even after retirement. Voors et al. (2010) also provides evidence based on field experiments in Burundi that exposure to violence leads individuals to be more risk seeking and to display more altruistic behaviors. The literature on political leaders similarly finds that their prior military experiences influence the critical decisions in office, including using military forces and possessing nuclear weapons (Fuhrmann and Horowitz 2014; Horowitz and Stam 2014).

Observable Implication

Two mechanisms — lowering the cost of collective action and increasing the demand for independence — account for the development of nationalist resistance. Military experiences help veterans overcome the collective action problem, which enables powerful organizational resistance. Furthermore, their value system was critical against the colonial authorities due to their dissatisfaction with the postwar economic compensation and newly acquired political perspectives. Therefore, in the colonial societies where the native population was recruited, nationalist movements were more likely to emerge.

Hypothesis 1: The increase in native military recruitment during WWII raises the likeli-

hood of post-war nationalist movements.

Data and Method

This paper uses native recruitment in WWII to explain the formation of nationalist movements. This empirical scope is particularly helpful given how states are born around the world. The post-WWII nationalist movements account for the majority of state-births after the rise of modern nation-states, going along with the trend of decolonization (Roeder 2007, p.8). According to the State System Membership List from Correlates of War Project, the post-WWII/Decolonization period gave birth to 115 nation-states, which exceed the number of states emerged in all other periods (Correlates of War Project 2017).[5] Hence, studying the post-WWII nationalist movements can substantially contribute to our understanding of state formation.

Unit of Observation: Segment-States

For testing the hypothesis, I draw upon the dataset from Roeder (2007). In the dataset, the unit of analysis is a 'segment-state,' which "divides its territory and population further among separate jurisdictions and gives the population that purportedly is indigenous to each jurisdiction a distinct political status" (Roeder 2007, p.12). In other words, segment-states are both administrative and communitive units that are distinctively separated from the government at the center. Substantively, the units include colonies, dependencies, protectorates, mandates, autonomous regions, and the former Soviet Republics. While one may question whether the former Soviet Republics are similar units to other segments under the colonial powers, it is better to include them since the theory applies to all potential units where states were able to recruit in WWII. In the empirical analysis, I further address this issue by controlling for each metropole and by excluding the former Soviet Republics from the sample. Also, reflecting on the temporal scope of WWII, I restricted the sample pe-

[5]The number of states born before WWII and after 1984 is 105.

riod from 1939 to 1984.[6] Especially after 1984, the dynamic of nationalist politics becomes utterly different from the earlier periods due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union.[7] This modification leaves 154 segment-states in the dataset.

Although these administrative units might not reflect all potential units for generating nationalist movements, they are the safest available option. First, segment-states reflect self-governable entities. Since nationalist movements demand the right to govern, it is likely to be aligned with segment-units. Second, segment-states, by the original definition in Roeder (2007), imply that the population constitutes some forms of community. Regardless of what constitutes the notion of community, it could be necessary that the population shares some idea of *imagined community* that could consolidate nationalism (Anderson 2006).[8] Lastly, segment-state as a unit of analysis seems to be the most appropriate way to overcome selection bias because it could incorporate 'failed' cases that did not generate a nationalist movement in each unit.[9]

Outcome Variable: Emergence of Nationalist Movement

In this paper, the outcome variable is a binary indicator of the emergence of nationalist movement in each segment, first coded by Coggins (2011). The sample is restricted to nationalist movements that emerged after the outbreak of WWII. Coggins coded the variable equals to one, if all the following conditions are met: "(1) it formally declares independence from its home state; (2) it has a national flag (signaling national consciousness); (3) it claims

[6] I set the start year in 1939, given some soldiers may have returned in the early phase of the war. I also test the theory with only the post-WWII sample.

[7] Roeder also categorizes this period as the third phase of nation-state creation. Other periods include 1816-1900 (the birth of modern nation-states), 1900-1941 (the dissolution of the Ottoman and the Austro-Hungarian Empires), and 1985-2000 (the dissolution of the Soviet Union).

[8] Another available unit of analysis is a proto-state, constructed by Griffiths (2015). The paper uses Roeder's dataset given the author's judgment that it has more relevant covariates for testing how nationalist movements appear.

[9] One might also wonder whether the use of segment-state selects large ethnic groups that are prone to create nationalist movements (Griffiths 2015). Even so, the sample of segment-state does not bias an estimate of recruitment effects if recruitment policy was similarly applied to minor ethnic groups. In Appendix 2.5, I provide some evidence that using segment-state sample does not lead to a biased estimate of recruitment effects.

an identifiable territory and population; and (4) its campaign lasts at least one calendar week, has greater than 100 active individuals, and claims greater than 100 square kilometers of territory" (Coggins 2011, p.454).

Following the original Coggins's data, I coded one if a nationalist movement exists in the corresponding segment for each year. Hence, the variable captures all active years of nationalist movements in segment-states. The coding reflects that the theory is agnostic on how each nationalist movement would exit from the data. For instance, nationalist movements may be short-lived either because they are weak and unsuccessful or because they are strong and quickly achieved the goal. To further address the issue of time dependence, I include the cubic polynomial approximation in the regression (Carter and Signorino 2010) and also use a different version of the outcome variable which is coded as one only in the onset year and as missing in the following years.

Although using segment-states as the unit of analysis — rather than independent states — is the best possible solution to deal with the endogeneity between units and the outcome of nationalist movements, one might still have a concern over whether the coding of segment-state is biased by the later outcome of nationalist movements and possibly, independence. There are several reasons why this might not be the case. First, fewer than half of segment-states generate nationalist movements in the sample period (47 out of 154). This shows that the status of segment-states does not necessarily yield the demand for nation-states. Second, segment-states consist of the first-level administrative units in the colonial empires, which are not necessarily equivalent to the unit of nation-states today. Some examples include the segment units in Southeast Asia, where both Britain and France established smaller first-level administrative units in the territories of Malaysia, Singapore (the Unfederated Malay States and the Federated Malay States), and Vietnam (Cochin China, Annam, and Tonkin). Lastly, even if the later outcome of being independent states affected how units are counted as a segment-state, developing nationalist movements is not necessarily relevant to the process. For instance, Lemke and Carter (2016, p.499) shows that many of the decolonized states

emerged without the rise of indigenous political power. These facts reduce the likelihood that the outcome of independence affects the relationship between nationalist movements and segment-states.

Moreover, Coggins's dataset of nationalist movements fits nicely with the analytic scope for this paper. First, it is the most complete dataset which incorporates information on the emergence of nationalist movements dating back to 1930. Importantly, the dataset includes non-violent nationalist movements as well, which provide a clear advantage over the other alternatives reporting only violent ones. The coding criteria also reflect whether potential candidates for nationalist movements successfully dealt with the problem of collective action. To be acknowledged as a nationalist movement in Coggins' criteria, it needs a group of people who pursue an organizational mission for a certain amount of time. Therefore, the requirements for nationalist movements fit nicely with testing the theoretical argument raised by this study.

Explanatory Variable: World War II Native Recruitment

To test the theoretical argument, I collected new data on native military recruitment during WWII.[10] The original data reports the approximate number of people in the native population recruited during the time of WWII. The number of soldiers reported in the data represents the wartime recruitment in WWII only, which is distinguished from the regular recruitment practices during peacetime. I generated three variables from the original data. First, I take the natural log of the number of recruited soldiers; this variable allows me to test whether the probability of developing nationalist movements increases as the size of recruitment is larger. Second, I coded a binary indicator with the threshold of recruiting more than ten thousand soldiers. The operationalization intends to compare the segments that experienced a substantial amount of WWII recruitment and the ones that did not.[11]

[10] In Appendix A3, I provide a description for each recruitment case.

[11] I also coded the variables with different threshold values (1, 1,000, and 5,000). The finding is robust to the choice of thresholds, and the results are reported in the Appendix.

Lastly, I use a measure of recruitment that is normalized by the population of each segment, accounting for differences in the group size.

The most well-known example of native recruitment in WWII is the use of soldiers from the British and French African colonies. These soldiers did not fight only in the African territories, but also were dispatched to the various locations around the world. For instance, the servicemen from the Gold Coast (present-day Ghana) traveled to Asia and fought the Japanese army in Burma. The British Colonial Office memorandum succinctly summarizes the African soldiers' contribution in WWII; "African soldiers beat Italians out of Somaliland and Abyssinia, defeating the best Blackshirt battalions $\cdots$. They defended British West Africa from attack from the Vichy territory, helped take Madagascar, and went to the Middle East as Pioneers and to the Far East to fight Japan" (Crawford 2015).

Figures 1 and 2 illustrate some descriptive statistics of WWII native recruitment. Figure 1 shows the total number of soldiers recruited from segments in each state. The Soviet Union recruited about 6.2 million soldiers outside Russia. Among other states where major colonial recruitment occurred in their overseas territories, Britain and France recruited the most, about 3.3 million and 0.8 million soldiers, respectively. The United States, Italy, and Japan also recruited considerable numbers outside their mainlands. The Netherlands and Belgium recruited soldiers from the Netherlands East Indies and the Belgian Congo, and Australia used a small number of troops from Papua and New Guinea.

Figure 2 provides more detailed information about how many native soldiers were recruited and from where. It shows, for instance, that Ukraine provided almost half of non-Russian soldiers in the Soviet Union, about 2.9 million. Britain recruited substantial numbers from their African colonies. The top five British segments that contributed the most in Africa were Nigeria, Kenya, Gold Coast, Tanganyika, and Uganda, where at least 75,000 soldiers were recruited from each segment. Also, Figure 2 underscores that native recruitment in WWII was indeed a global event. In most places in Africa and Asia, people were substantially recruited to support their metropole in war. Even the islands in the Pacific, Tonga and

Fiji provided Britain with about 3,000 soldiers. Smaller colonial powers, like the Netherlands and Japan also recruited soldiers outside their mainland. The major reinforcement to the Dutch included about 56,000 soldiers from the Netherlands East Indies. Japan recruited about 290,000 from Manchukuo, Taiwan, and Korea. Even in the region least affected by this event, South America, there were two recruitment cases. About five-thousand soldiers were recruited from British Guiana and Suriname, mainly for self-defense.

Figure 1: Total Number of Soldiers from Segments



Figure 2: Number of Soldiers Recruited from Segments



Note: The number of soldiers is presented on the polygon of a corresponding segment if the segment became an independent nation-state at some points. If not, the numbers are aggregated and presented on the metropole's mainland. For instance, the number of soldiers from Manchukuo is plotted on Japan, while the number from Korea is plotted on its corresponding geographic territory of Korea. This transformation is made only for this figure.

Addressing Barriers to Inference

One potential barrier for testing the argument is that recruitment occurred in a non-random manner. Any observed relationship between native recruitment in World War II and the subsequent emergence of nationalist movements, then, could be spurious. To reduce the risk of omitted variable bias, I control for several confounding factors.

First, both recruitment and the likelihood of generating nationalist movements may have been affected by whether the metropole engaged in WWII in the first place. Recruitment did not occur in the Spanish and Portuguese colonies since the metropoles did not actively engage in WWII. Spain and Portugal remained nominally neutral during the war, and there were no efforts to recruit soldiers from their colonies. On the contrary, war facilitated the recruitment by the belligerents. When war against Germany became inevitable, France spurred recruiting from its colonies (Maghraoui 2014, p.573). Given that only the colonies whose metropoles fought in WWII paid the cost of war, whether each metropole fought could directly shape the likelihood of nationalist uprisings. To deal with this possibility, I

control for the WWII belligerents. Additionally, I control for country (metropole) factor variables so that being governed by different metropoles does not confound the effect of native recruitment in the statistical models.

Second, the regime type of metropoles can influence the mode of military recruitment in segments. Scholars raised various arguments on the relationship between democracy and military recruitment (Asal, Conrad and Toronto 2017; Scheve and Stasavage 2010) One line of arguments is that democratic countries are sensitive to wartime sacrifices made by the mass citizens (Horowitz, Simpson and Stam 2011). If democracies care about protecting their citizens in the mainland, they may be more likely to recruit soldiers outside. By contrast, if democracies are sensitive to the casualties made in their country as a whole, recruitment from segments should decrease. Also, scholars have suggested that the political ideas and institutions of colonial power had been implanted in their colonies (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001). This means that the regime type of metropole affects the normative and institutional grounds of colonies that generate nationalist movements. In general, for instance, the native elites enjoyed a wider opportunity to participate in governments in the British colonies where the metropole arguably applied the democratic legal norms and institutions (Furnivall 2014; Pearce 1982). Given these considerations, I control for the polity score of each metropole to account for the possibility that the regime type of metropole might confound the relationship between the recruitment and nationalist movements.

Third, the military occupation of colonies by enemy forces deprives metropoles of the chance for native recruitment. In the segments that were militarily occupied right after the war broke out — for instance, British Somaliland — recruitment was physically impossible because of lost territorial control. Military occupation could also cause hatred and economic hardship among the subjugated population, which might result in a higher likelihood of inviting post-war nationalist movements.[12] Therefore, I control for whether the enemy forces had occupied each segment during the war.

[12]For a detailed discussion, see Kocher, Lawrence and Monteiro (2018).

Fourth, the size of the population in segments could have influenced the metropole's decision on where it recruits. It is reasonable to believe that the metropole would prefer recruiting from the segments where it could secure a large number of soldiers. This incentive should be even higher when the size of the population is relatively bigger compared to that of the metropole, exemplified by the British call for support from the Indian National Congress. On the other hand, the size of the population can influence the chance of having nationalist movements in segments through the political and economic power accompanied by the population size. A large number of population can also help develop a rhetoric that the people deserve their own state. Based on these concerns, I control for the population of each segment and metropole (Greig and Enterline 2017).

Fifth, I address segment-level institutional factors measured by Roeder (2007), which code whether segments had locally constituted legislatures and an executive. Segments possessing their own decision-bodies may have facilitated native recruitment if it reflects the stronger administrative capacity to recruit from the population. Also, segments with the locally constituted legislature and executive might indicate that the local elites had already accumulated the experiences of governing themselves, which would increase the chance of developing nationalist movements later on (Anderson 2006).

Additionally, I control for various segment-specific factors that might have influenced both recruitment decisions and nationalist movements. I control for the status of an 'external segment' whose location is not contiguous to the common state (Roeder 2007, pp. 46-47), based on the concern that recruitment might have been easier when segments were located next to their metropole. At the same time, segments located close to the metropole might have absorbed the idea of nationalism earlier than the others. In addition, I control for whether each segment was previously a sovereign state or a state-like entity. It addresses the concern that the development of nationalism was initially more likely in some segments than in others due to their prior history of state development. For a similar reason, I also control for the year each segment was incorporated in the metropole. The segments that

were established in the earlier period might hold a better administrative and educational environment that facilitates recruiting native population and developing nationalist movements. Also, I control for the linguistic heterogeneity, which accounts for whether the main language used in each segment is different from the language of the metropole. It is possible that the language difference discourages metropole from recruiting people from segments, and at the same time, increases the likelihood of developing nationalism. These variables were incorporated from Roeder's (2007) dataset.

It is also possible that richer segments possessed a high mobilization potential both for the war and nationalist movements. Given that there is a paucity of data to account for the wealth of segments, I use the segment's contiguity to the sea as a proxy. While sea contiguity is unable to perfectly capture the segment-level variation in wealth, scholars have suggested that it can be a reasonable proxy of economic development. First of all, proximity to sea nurtures segments by lessening the transaction costs for trade (Bosker, Buringh and Van Zanden 2013; De Vries 2013). Second, especially in the context of colonial development, segments at the shoreline were likely to be wealthier because the administrative capacity of colonial government was limited to the coastal regions (Herbst 2014). The expansion to the hinterland was limited due to the high cost of extending the necessary infrastructure to rule (Herbst 2014, p.62). As a result, economic development under the colonial governments would be likely to be concentrated on their coastal acquisitions, manifested by several examples including South Africa, Ghana, Angola, and Mozambique (Herbst 2014, p.62, 64)

Lastly, I control for the subsequent years after 1960. The United Nations General Assembly issued 'Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,' and it provided the declaration of independence to many colonies. Based on one of Coggin's criteria for being a nationalist movement — a formal declaration of full-independence — many nationalist movements automatically entered into data. Hence, I added the 'decolonization' dummy variable for describing subsequent years after the Declaration.

Since the main explanatory variable does not vary with time, I use the random-effects

model to address concerns about unobservable confounders. Especially, the random-effects model is the best alternative when the fixed-effect estimator perfectly accounts for the time-unvarying predictor (Clark and Linzer 2015). The empirical goal of the statistical model here is to retrieve the between-segment effect of native recruitment while minimizing the influence from the segment-specific unobservable confounders. The use of the segment-level fixed-effects is the most appropriate for the latter purpose, but it is unable to measure the effect of time-invariant variables since all degrees of freedom at segment-level would be consumed (Bell and Jones 2015, p.139). Therefore, the use of the random-effects model is an optimal solution for the empirical focus of this paper.

The potential threat to inference of using the random-effects specification is when the level of correlation between the unit effects and the predictor variable is high. While the unit effects are unknown, Clark and Linzer (2015) shows that the parameter estimates by the random-effects model are likely to be unbiased when both the length of time and the number of units are sufficiently large (Clark and Linzer 2015, pp.404-407). The structure of the data accords with the sufficient lengths and numbers suggested by Clark and Linzer (2015), which alleviates the concern for the use of the random-effects.[13]

Findings

Table 1 displays the results of the regression analysis of post-WWII nationalist movements. Standard errors are clustered at the segment-states level to account for heteroskedastic error process and arbitrary serial correlation. Model 1 and 2 report the baseline results using the continuous measure of native recruitment; Model 3 uses the binary indicator; and Model 4 uses a measure of recruitment that is normalized by the population of each segment. All models provide evidence consistent with Hypothesis 1: the coefficients for native recruitment are positive and statistically significant at the 95% level. Military recruitment,

[13]With 100 units and 50 observations per unit, Clark and Linzer (2015) shows the root-mean-squared error from the random-effects model converges with the one from the fixed-effects model in 'standard' case, and the random-effects model performs a way better than the pooled-model even in the worst-case scenario. With 154 units and 46 observations per unit, the use of the random-effects seems to be appropriate.

therefore, increases the likelihood of nationalism regardless of how I measure the former concept. The finding also remains robust when using the observations after the end of WWII only (Model 5), excluding the observations after the first year of nationalist movements (Model 6), using regional fixed effects (Model 7) and year fixed effects (Model 8).

How substantial is the effect of native recruitment on the emergence of nationalist movements? Based on Model 2, I calculated the predicted probability of developing nationalist movements in a segment when all other factors are held constant at their average values. Increasing recruitment by 10% is associated with an increase in the probability of the emergence of nationalist movements by about 30.5% on average. Using the dichotomous variable of native recruitment in each segment — whether recruitment occurred or not —, native recruitment makes the average segment about three times more likely to develop nationalist movements (about 1.1% to 3.3%). Furthermore, Figure 3 shows that the substantive effect of colonial recruitment is large compared to other covariates in the model. The average marginal effect of recruitment is about 9% higher than the effect of having a prior history of the state or state-like entity. Given the fundamental role of the past history in constituting national identity, the impact of the recruitment seems to be quite substantial (Anderson 2006). Compared to the institutional factors, the size of the effect is even more pronounced. The effect of native recruitment is about five times higher than that of external segments (Roeder 2007) and much higher than that of possessing self-governing institutions (Anderson 2006).

Table 1: Regression Analysis of Post-WWII Nationalist Movements

	Model 1 Baseline	Model 2 Baseline	Model 3 Baseline	Model 4 Baseline	Model 5 Post-1945	Model 6 Onset	Model 7 Regional FE	Model 8 Year FE
ln(Soldiers)	0.237***	0.176**			0.230**	0.174**	0.149**	0.203***
	(0.0745)	(0.0724)			(0.0914)	(0.0777)	(0.0721)	(0.0764)
Soldiers> 10000			2.128***					
			(0.759)					
ln(Soldiers/population)				0.249***				
				(0.0810)				
World War II		-1.049	-1.355	-4.869*	9.631	-0.848	-1.068	10.47
		(2.553)	(2.428)	(2.706)	(9.775)	(2.600)	(2.782)	(10.45)
Polity		-0.00528	0.00454	0.0226	-0.177	0.0335	-0.0102	-0.119
		(0.0590)	(0.0602)	(0.0590)	(0.175)	(0.0600)	(0.0627)	(0.114)
Occupation		0.175	0.391	0.500	0.237	0.444	0.710	0.0212
		(0.773)	(0.644)	(0.627)	(0.942)	(0.910)	(0.756)	(0.838)
ln(Segment population)		0.740***	0.590**		0.804***	0.787**	0.687**	0.696**
		(0.246)	(0.245)		(0.302)	(0.307)	(0.283)	(0.286)
ln(Metropole population)		-0.323	-0.159	0.616	-3.214	-0.707	-0.329	-3.671
		(0.787)	(0.775)	(0.787)	(2.928)	(0.803)	(0.803)	(3.370)
Local institutions		0.0551	0.120	-0.547	0.458	-0.0462	0.0899	0.217
		(0.711)	(0.707)	(0.611)	(0.898)	(0.634)	(0.730)	(0.755)
Language heterogeneity		-0.347	-0.470	-0.351	-0.944	0.401	-1.110	-0.528
		(0.772)	(0.810)	(0.992)	(0.897)	(1.479)	(0.859)	(0.774)
External segments		0.464	0.811	0.290	0.562	0.732	0.599	0.659
		(0.628)	(0.627)	(0.497)	(0.650)	(0.611)	(0.626)	(0.671)
Prior-state		1.060**	1.048**	1.154**	1.191	1.149**	1.312**	1.016*
		(0.493)	(0.439)	(0.540)	(0.779)	(0.551)	(0.513)	(0.562)
Establishment year		0.0139	0.0359	0.0262	-0.0131	0.0630	0.00909	0.0310
		(0.0395)	(0.0395)	(0.0498)	(0.0492)	(0.0676)	(0.0370)	(0.0479)
Sea contiguity		-1.630	-1.236	-1.206	-2.950**	-1.714	-1.410	-1.758
		(1.124)	(1.111)	(1.005)	(1.477)	(1.166)	(1.320)	(1.127)
Decolonization		0.593	0.671	0.553	0.785	0.357	0.563	
		(0.445)	(0.441)	(0.488)	(0.542)	(0.646)	(0.435)	
Constant	0.373	-26.37	-69.35	-51.65	70.20	-121.9	-16.32	-3.214
	(0.757)	(76.76)	(76.78)	(97.65)	(116.0)	(131.0)	(72.19)	(116.0)
Metropole FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3927	3525	3525	3525	2874	2945	3492	3098

Standard errors in parentheses. Controlling for the time dependence of outcome variable, I use t, t^2, and t^3 (Carter and Signorino 2010). t, t^2, t^3, metropole and year fixed effects are suppressed in the table.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Figure 3: Predictive Probability of Nationalist Movements: Average Marginal Effects



Note: The confidence interval at 95% level.

The theory also has an implication concerning the effect of military experience over time. The existing literature shows the effect of military service persists after retirement but also predicts that the effect is likely to decay after some time due to socialization, aging, and dispersion (Jackson et al. 2012; Jha and Wilkinson 2012, p.885; Erikson and Stoker 2011, p.233). These works report that the effect remains strongest five to ten years after retirement. The pattern is also consistent with the historical accounts that describe nationalist uprisings after WWII as mostly instantaneous events after demobilization.[14] Figure 4 plots the predicted probability of nationalist movement onsets as a function of native recruitment and time.[15] The figure illustrates that the difference of the predicted outcomes between two

[14]For instance, Zimmerman (2011).

[15]The underlying model is an unrestricted model with the variable-time interaction terms (Carter and Signorino 2010). Other than this, the model is identical to Model 1, except it uses the onset as an outcome variable and the dichotomous measure as an explanatory variable. In Appendix 1.2, I also report the

groups — the segments with recruitment and the ones without — is positive and statistically significant during the next eight years after the war. Afterward, the two groups converge, and the difference between them is no longer statistically significant. The pattern provides evidence consistent with the theory's expectations. Furthermore, it reduces the chance that the finding is simply driven by the underlying unit-level difference, which does not vary with time.

Figure 4: Predictive Probability of Nationalist Movements Over Time



Note: The confidence interval at 95% level.

To test the robustness of these findings, I conduct a series of sensitivity analyses in Appendix A2. In Appendix A2.1, I use alternative measures of native recruitment by changing the threshold values of its binary indicator. The finding remains robust to the choice of

conditional marginal effects of native recruitment, including controls. It similarly shows that the effect is positive and statistically significant until the first five years after the end of WWII and decreases in the late 1950s.

threshold values.[16] Also, I show that the finding is robust to alternative measures of control variables (ethnic heterogeneity, local institutions, having a prior-history of state, and metropole regime type) in Appendix A2.2. In addition, one might wonder the former Soviet Republics are similar to other segments, considering their geographical locations next to Russia and in Europe. Therefore, I reestimated the baseline model by excluding each country from the estimation sample in Appendix A2.3. The finding is generally robust to dropping the segments of single countries.[17] Similarly, the results remain robust if I exclude the potential outlier segments from the sample. Lastly, since the main explanatory variable does not vary with time, one might wonder if the finding is generated by artificially inflating the number of observations. Adjusting for the time-varying components, I reestimated the baseline model with cross-sectional data. With this specification, the number of observations decreases from 3,462 to 113. The coefficient of the logged number of soldiers increases from 0.237 to 0.306, which is statistically significant at the 99% level. In sum, the results from the additional analyses support the main finding: native recruitment in WWII is positively associated with the emergence of post-war nationalist movements.

Further Addressing Endogeneity

The previous empirical analyses addressed concerns about endogeneity by controlling for the observable indicators that could confound the observed correlation as well as using the random-effects model, which accounts for the unmeasured segment-specific factors. Some may remain concerned, however, that the findings merely reflect circularity: segments with

[16]Furthermore, the results provide additional evidence consistent with the theory that the coefficient of recruitment increases as higher threshold values were used. It implies that the effect on nationalist movements is stronger when the size of recruitment is large, which supports the hypothesis. Simultaneously, the standard errors also increase when the threshold values were set higher, reflecting that the measures with higher thresholds treat some of the recruitment cases that successfully developed nationalist movements later as non-recruitment cases.

[17]I removed the Soviet Union, Britain, France, the United States, Japan, and Italy individually from the full sample. The coefficients for native recruitment are positive and statistically significant at the 90% level, except the case of excluding the French segments (p-value of 0.143). This suggests that the theory applies well, especially in the French cases, where the grievance of native soldiers in the French military was reported to be higher than the other cases.

a higher potential to develop nationalist movements recruited more soldiers in WWII. One could argue, for instance, states strategically targeted the segments with a growing sense of nationalism to cost them a 'blood tax' (Echenberg 1975). Also, recruitment could have been a policy tool to integrate the nationalist segments with the metropole, similar to the strategy often implemented in the post-civil war context (Samii 2013). Following these arguments, states can use recruitment as a controlling device either to punish or to further integrate nationalistic segments. If these arguments are true, the recruitment should have been levied more heavily against the segments with a growing sense of nationalism.

However, even if an endogenous process is at work, it likely points in the opposite direction. First of all, states worried about the possible blowback from arming the highly nationalistic populations. States bear a higher risk when they recruit from nationalistic segments since the soldiers could always turn against the states and possibly play a leading role in secessionist conflicts. For instance, Japan abstained from the active conscription of the Korean population since it couldn't "trust" that the Koreans were loyal to the Japanese rule (Pyo 2014, p.99). Also, Japan worried that the recruitment would increase the level of interest in politics among the Korean mass and would lead to the demand for a larger representation of the Koreans in the government (Pyo 2014, p.99).

Furthermore, the cost of recruitment was likely to be higher in places where nationalists held some political power. In such places, states had to bargain with the nationalist elites for securing their support in the recruitment. For instance, the Indian National Congress launched the Quit India Movement in August 1942, which refused to fight in a war before independence was granted (Muni 1977). The set of episodes suggests that given these concerns and costs in the segments with a high level of nationalism, recruitment should have been rather less likely in the highly nationalistic segments. Even if the endogenous process was real, therefore, it should attenuate the effect of colonial recruitment rather than amplify it.

To further address the endogeneity issue empirically, I exploit the segments which had

already developed nationalist movements prior to WWII. The rationale here is that we should observe more recruitment cases in the segments which already developed nationalist movements if states were to punish or integrate segments through the recruitment policy. On the contrary, if states worried more about the backfire and costs from recruitment, as I argued, we should observe that the recruitment should have been less likely in the segments which already developed nationalist movements before the war.

Figure 5 provides supportive evidence for the latter hypothesis that colonial powers recruited less from the segments where they were concerned about nationalist movements. Figure 5a shows that the average number of recruited soldiers was about 46% lower in the segments which developed nationalist movements before WWII. Figure 5b further demonstrates the point that controlling for the number of population, the predicted probability of recruiting more than ten thousand soldiers was significantly less in the segments which had developed nationalist movements prior to the war. These results suggest that the earlier finding is hardly an artifact of colonial powers recruiting more from the places where the risk of nationalist resistance was high.

Figure 5: Number of Soldiers: Nationalist Movements Before WWII



Note: Figure 5a shows the mean number of soldiers by whether segments had developed nationalist movements before WWII or not. It excludes Russia and India since the average number of soldiers recruited was exceptionally large in two cases. The central result — segments with no nationalist movements before WWII recruited more soldiers — does not change even if the sample includes these outliers. Figure 5b, which includes all cases, shows that controlling for the number of population in segments, the segments which developed nationalist movements before WWII had a substantially lower chance to be recruited. The prediction is generated by holding the number of population at mean in the sample, about 730,000 with the confidence interval at 95% level.

Discussions and Conclusion

In this article, I explored when and where the demand for new nation-states appeared in the 20th century. I argued that the wartime experiences of veterans enhance the motives for participating in nationalist movements while also decreasing the costs of doing so. Therefore, nationalist movements are more likely to emerge in the places where the colonial powers recruited the native population. I tested this hypothesis using the original data on

WWII recruitment by colonial powers. A random effects analysis that controls for observable confounders provided evidence supporting the theoretical claim. The main result remains robust to alternative model specifications. The finding is particularly striking given that states were unwilling to recruit from the colonies where they expected strong nationalist challenges in the future. This reduces the likelihood that the result is an artifact of colonial powers strategically recruiting in places where the risk of nationalism was high.

The 20th century witnessed a surge of new nation-states. Previous studies examined this trend from the perspective of the colonial powers, emphasizing under what conditions they let go of their former colonies. The decision of metropole to grant independence, crucial as it is, is only a part of decolonization, however. The era of decolonization started with the rise of nationalist movements around the world, and it was their aspiration for independent statehood that pressured the colonial powers to make such decisions. Pearce describes the British position in 1947 on the African decolonization that "political concessions would only be granted when the nationalists had achieved the unity and popular support required to insist on them, that is at the latest possible date" (Pearce 1982, p.170). This paper contributes to our understanding of state formation by exploring the origins of nationalist movements, which played a vital role in creating the international system we see today.

This paper reevaluated the effect of war on state formation in the 20th century from a different perspective. Boix and Stokes pointed out that "most studies of state-building have focused on Europe in the modern period; the recent emergence of independent states outside of Europe in the last centuries is not adequately explained by these accounts" (Boix and Stokes 2007, p.8). Echoing this idea, scholars have identified the important factors unique to secession, which significantly advanced our knowledge on state formation (Spruyt 2005; Roeder 2007; Fazal and Griffiths 2014; Griffiths 2015, 2016). While studying secession, this paper revisited the classic idea that 'war made states' (Tilly 1992). Similar to the European state formation in the early modern era, the paper showed that war facilitated the emergence of new nation-states in the 20th century, too. Yet, it emphasized an alternative mechanism

from war to state formation: by altering the way people think and behave, rather than accumulating coercion or financing the cost of war (Horowitz and Stam 2014). Using the established framework on how military and combat experiences guide future political actions, the paper showed how war contributed to the birth of new states in the 20th century by generating the demand for independent statehood.

This study raises new questions about the effect of colonial policies on the former-colonies. It leaves open for further examination of how native recruitment influenced politics beyond generating nationalist movements. Scholars acknowledge how states achieved independence left a profound legacy on regime type, patronage politics, and conflict propensity of new states (Lemke and Carter 2016; Kenny 2015; Denk and Lehtinen 2019). By forming a strong indigenous political power, native recruitment could have a lingering effect on post-independence politics. Lastly, while most nationalist movements during decolonization endorsed the entire population in each colony, some minority ethnic groups launched their own secessionist movements (Heraclides 1991). The colonial governments often recruited some ethnic groups more than others; they sought the martial tribes (commonly called as 'martial race') as their primary source of local police and military forces (Brands 2005). Identifying how the colonial policies affected ethnic identification in newly independent states represents an important future research agenda (Robinson 2014).

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Online Appendix for Demand for Statehood: The Case of Native Military Recruitment in World War II

Contents

1 Appendix A1: Descriptive Statistics & Supplementary Figures

1.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table 1: Descriptive statistics

	Mean	SD
Nationalist Movement	0.142	0.349
ln(Soldiers)	5.321	5.132
World War II	0.908	0.289
Polity	4.67	8.095
Occupation	0.146	0.353
ln(Segment population)	13.249	2.138
ln(Metropole population)	17.702	1.107
Local institutions	0.682	0.466
Language heterogeneity	0.118	0.322
External segments	0.673	0.469
Prior-state	0.146	0.349
Establishment year	1907.227	11.485
Sea contiguity	0.854	0.353
Decolonization	0.362	0.481
Nationalist Movement before WWII	0.086	0.281
Observations	4407	

The table reports the mean and standard deviations of the variables used in the main models (Table 1 in the article).

1.2 Marginal Effect of Native Recruitment Over Time

Figure 2: Marginal Effect of Native Recruitment Over Time



Note: The confidence interval at 95% level.

2 Appendix A2: Additional Robustness Tests

2.1 Alternative Recruitment Measures

In the paper, I reported the results using two measures of native recruitment (logged number of soldiers and binary indicator of recruiting more than 10,000). Table 4 shows the replications of same model with the alternative thresholds of measuring native recruitment. The first model in table 4 uses the measure of whether recruitment existed or not (Soldiers> 0). The second and third models also use different thresholds (Soldiers> 1000, Soldiers> 5000). The finding is robust to different measures of recruitment. As the threshold increases, the size of coefficients also increases. It may indicate that the effect of recruitment was higher in the places where the size of recruitment was high, which supports the theory. Yet, the standard errors also increase, reflecting that the measures with higher thresholds treat some

Table 3: Alternative Recruitment Measures

	(1) Recruitment > 0	(2) Recruitment > 1000	(3) Recruitment > 5000
Recruitment	1.210**	1.254**	1.658**
	(0.592)	(0.626)	(0.731)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3525	3525	3525

Standard errors in parentheses. t, t^2, t^3 and constant are suppressed.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

of the recruitment cases as non-recruitment cases, which developed nationalist movements later.

2.2 Alternative Controls

In this section, I ran the baseline model with different set of control variables. These variables differently measure the same confounders (ethnic heterogeneity, local institutions, having a prior-history of state, and metropole regime type) that I controlled for in the main empirical analysis. Using alternative measures ensure the finding is not an artifact of choosing specific measures. All the segment-level variables are originally coded by Roeder (2007).

In Table 5, the first model uses 'Linguistic + religious heterogeneity' variable instead of linguistic heterogeneity only. The second model uses three component measures of 'Local institutions.' Each variable - internal protectorate, external protectorate, and central executive & local legislature is a binary of indicator of whether a segment held locally constituted legislatures. External and internal protectorates possessed locally constituted executive as well. Lastly, the third model replicates the baseline model with an alternative variable of having a prior history of state, whether a segment had a state-like entity (e.g. Hawaii in the U.S.). Throughout the specifications, the coefficients of recruitment variable remain positive and statistically significant.

In Table 6, I use different measures of metropole regime type. In the original Polity measure, some cases have values of -66, -77, and -88, which represent when the metropoles

Table 4: Alternative Controls

	(1) Religion	(2) Institutions	(3) State-like entity
ln(Soldiers)	0.177**	0.173**	0.176**
	(0.0731)	(0.0730)	(0.0724)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3525	3525	3525

Standard errors in parentheses. t, t^2, t^3 and constant are suppressed.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5: Alternative Regime Type Measures

	(1) Democracy_binary	(2) Polity
ln(Soldiers)	0.183***	0.237***
	(0.0699)	(0.0810)
Controls	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes
Observations	3531	3462

Standard errors in parentheses. t, t^2, t^3 and constant are suppressed.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

experienced regime transition or foreign interventions. In the context of this paper, the cases include France, Netherlands, and Belgium under the Nazi occupation period. Some segments fought against Germany (e.g. French Equatorial Africa and the Dutch East Indies) but the others followed the new government under the German rule (e.g. French Indochina). Since it is uncertain to code the regime type of metropoles in these cases, I exclude these case-years as a robustness check. The first model uses the binary indicator of democracy. Hence, it treats the cases of regime transition or foreign interventions as 'nondemocratic' given their polity scores are under -5. In the second model, I used the original Polity measure, excluding the values of -66, -77, and -88. In both models, the main finding remains robust.

2.3 Alternative Specification of Samples

In the baseline model, the samples include all the pre-WWII segments that had not developed nationalist movements. One might wonder, however, that the Soviet Republics are not similar to other segments not only because they are close to metropole but also because they are different from other 'colonies.' Therefore, in the first model of Table 7,

Table 6: Different sample specifications

	(1) Non-Soviet cases	(2) Including pre-WWII nationalist movements	(3) No India and Russia
ln(Soldiers)	0.164*	0.190**	0.174**
	(0.0839)	(0.0779)	(0.0734)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3013	3800	3479

Standard errors in parentheses. t, t^2, t^3 and constant are suppressed.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

I replicated the baseline model by excluding the Soviet Republic segments. The coefficient of recruitment remains positive and statistically significant at 90% level (p-value of 0.051). Figure 8 similarly reports the coefficients of native recruitment (logged number of soldiers) by excluding individual countries (Soviet Union, Britain, France, the United States, Japan and Italy). This analysis illustrates the relative importance of the French cases, which supports the conventional wisdom that the treatment of native soldiers in the French military was generally harsher than the other troops, for instance, the British Army. Interestingly, the coefficient increases as I exclude the British samples, which coincides with this speculation.

The baseline model excluded the segments that had already developed nationalist movements before WWII. I excluded these cases because it could inflate the effect of native recruitment by including the cases that nationalist movements emerged before recruitment happens. One might wonder, however, whether it could distort the effect of native recruitment since recruitment could have enhanced nationalist movements even if they existed before WWII. The second model in Table 7 shows that the finding remains robust if we include the pre-WWII nationalist movements cases. Lastly, the third model reports the result excluding the potential outliers, India and Russia.

Table 8: Cross-sectional models

	(1) Polity	(2) Democracy
ln(Soldiers)	0.306***	0.308***
	(0.0884)	(0.0879)
Controls	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes
Observations	113	113

Standard errors in parentheses. Constant is suppressed in the table.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Figure 7: Coefficient plot: excluding individual countries



Note: The confidence interval at 95% level.

2.4 Cross-sectional Analysis

In this section, I report the results from cross-sectional analyses. Since the main explanatory variable does not vary with time, one might wonder that the result is artificially generated by inflating the number of observations. Therefore, I reestimated the cross-sectional model by dropping all the time-varying components. The result remains robust: the coefficient of native recruitment remains positive and statistically significant in 99% level. The result also remains robust if I use continuous polity score or a binary indicator of democracy.

2.5 Further Addressing Selection Problem

Having segment-institutions may increase the chance of developing nationalist movements (Roeder 2007; Griffiths 2015). Yet, it does not lead to a biased estimate of recruitment effects unless the status of segment-state also influences the recruitment decisions. Below, I show some evidence that the colonial powers recruited from ethnic groups in proportion to their size in each segment. This suggests that recruitment policy was similarly applied to minor ethnic groups that may not possess the status of segment-state, and therefore, reduces the concern of using segment-state as a unit of analysis.

While the global data for answering this question is not available, one could still look at some recruitment cases that provide the information on the ethnic composition of colonial military. Table 10 shows that in Kenya, the colonial government recruited from ethnic groups in proportion to their size (Parsons 1999, p.59). Major ethnic groups like Kamba, Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru, Luo and Luhya provided large number of soldiers to the military. A similar pattern is shown in Nyasaland; most soldiers were recruited from the ethnic groups accounting for over 10% of the total population.

Similarly, the French also recruited from ethnic groups in proportion to their size. The French government set the fixed quota on the number of recruits per each administrative district. According to Echenberg (1991), the quota is primarily constructed by the number of population in each district. Hence, the ethnic composition of colonial military is likely to represent that of the African population.[1]

[1]For detailed explanation, see Echenberg (1991), pp. 47-64.

Table 9: Ethnic Composition of Kenyan KAR Battalion and African Population (by percentage)

Ethnic Group	KAR (1945)	Population (1948)
Kamba	19.4	11.6
Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru	21.7	29.6
Kalenjin	7.2	6.5
Luo	16.0	13.2
Luhya	9.4	12.5
Samburu	0.5	0.5
Somali and Other Northern Pastoralists	0.8	1.5
Foreign-Born Askaris	0	-
Other	25	24.6
Total	76,797	5,251,120

Table 10: Ethnic Composition of Nyasaland KAR Battalions and African Population (by percentage)

Ethnic Group	KAR (1943)	Population (1943)
Chewa	11.8	23.2
Nyanja	17.8	17.2
Yao	20.0	15.4
Lomwe (Nguru)	26.7	14.7
Ngoni	15.7	13.6
Tumbuka	2.9	6.9
Tonga	2.0	3.5
Chikunda	1.2	3.0
Nkonde	0.3	1.9
Wemba	0.2	0.4
Others	2.3	0.2

Sources: Parsons (1999), pp.58-59, p.91.

3 Appendix A3: Description of Recruitment Data

This section documents the number of soldiers raised in segments where their metropoles participated in WWII and a brief description for each recruitment case. The data is collected from various sources including primary sources, books, articles, and web pages. The reported numbers are the best available estimates. Following the ISQ guideline (the maximum 10 pages at the end of the main document), this section presents five recruitment cases in Britain as an example. Further information available from the author upon request.

Britain

Bermuda

Number of soldiers: 100

Description: The data reports the number of soldiers from Bermuda in the Caribbean Regiment. There were three officers and 97 other ranks.

Gibraltar

Number of soldiers: 50

Description: Gibraltar governor introduced conscription for training an anti-aircraft gun force. The number was less than 50.

Malta

Number of soldiers: 1,000

Description: In Malta, the British Malta garrison was reinforced during WWII. Some troops came from the British Isles. The number of soldiers in King's Own Malta Regiment were tripled compared to the peacetime, from one to three battalions.

Cyprus

Number of soldiers: 25,000

Description: In 1940, the Cypriot Volunteers were formed into a regiment, the Cyprus Regiment. It fought in various places including Dunkirk, Eritrea, and Egypt.

Gambia

Number of soldiers: 4,500

Description: Gambia was affiliated with the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF). The number of soldiers from Gambia accounted for about 2% of the RWAFF. All the data for the British African colonies was collected from a single source: Killingray, Fighting for Britain, 2010. James Currey.